New Book: God and Evil

When it comes to philosophy of religion, there are few topics as challenging, and interesting, as the problem of evil.  At least as far back as the ancient thinker Epicurus, philosophers have been wrestling with the question, If God exists, then why is there evil?  How can so much sin and suffering in the world be consistent with an all-powerful, perfectly good God?  Much ink has been spilled on this issue, both critiquing religious belief because of this problem and offering reasons why God might permit evil.

At no time in history has there been so much published on the topic as there has been in the last few decades.  Innovative formulations of the problem and equally innovative means of rebutting the objection continue to emerge, advancing the discussion in illuminating ways.  The newly 3784published God and Evil: The Case for God in a World Filled with Pain (InterVarsity, 2013) is a welcome addition to the conversation.  Edited by Chad Meister and James K. Dew, Jr., the book features contributions from over twenty scholars, dealing with a wide variety of issues.

The first part of the book features three chapters (by Greg Ganssle, Yena Lee, James Dew and Bruce Little) that distinguish different formulations of the problem of evil.  This is followed by a section offering several defenses and theodicies, including the “free process” defense (Garry DeWeese), the Augustinian approach (Doug Geivett), the Leibnizian “best possible world” theodicy, (Jill Graper Hernandez), and the Irenaean “soul-making” theodicy (by yours truly).

The next section features chapters on a variety of issues, including original sin and primeval sin (Paul Copan), the hiddenness of God (Chad Meister), evil and prayer (Charles Taliaferro), evil and the resurrection of Jesus (Gary Habermas), evil in non-Christian religions (Win Corduan), evil and the new atheism (David Beck), and evil as evidence for Christianity (Greg Ganssle).

The fourth section addresses issues of special current interest, including evil and religious diversity (William Lane Craig), evil and the problem of Hell (Kyle Blanchette and Jerry Walls), evil and intelligent design (William Dembski), and evil and evolution (Karl Giberson and Francis Collins).  The book concludes with an appendix featuring the transcript of a well-known debate on the problem of evil between William Lane Craig and Michael Tooley.

Naturally, I was delighted to be a part of this project, and I’m eager to dig into the book with the Philosophy of Religion class I am teaching this semester.  It is especially gratifying to see all of the Taylor University connections represented in the volume, including my illustrious colleague Win Corduan, our former student Jill Graper Hernandez (now a professor at University of Texas at San Antonio), and Doug Geivett, whom I replaced at Taylor when he left for Talbott School of Theology two decades ago.

If you are looking for a book that will introduce you to current perspectives on evil and provide a rich set of resources for responding to the problem, God and Evil would be ideal.  All of us who contributed were careful to write our chapters in an engaging style that is informative but does not bog down in technical detail.  So the book will be of interest to both the lay reader as well as the seasoned scholar.

Conference on Positive Psychology

In the field of psychology there has traditionally been an emphasis on psychological disorders—the various ways in which people malfunction in regards to their patterns of thought and behavior.  That is, you might say that the standard approach in the field has been negative.  A recent movement in the field, led by such scholars as Martin Seligman and Christopher Peterson, aims to correct this by focusing on healthy or well-ordered human traits and behavioral patterns.  This alternative (or supplementary) approach has been dubbed positive psychology.

Although very influential, not much work has been done in Christian psychological circles to assess this approach.  This past weekend I was privileged to speak at a conference of the Society for Christian Psychology devoted to precisely this.  The theme was “Towards a Christian Positive Psychology,” and I was among several invited speakers who addressed themes related to the subject.  Each of our papers can be accessed here.

The Society for Christian Psychology was founded in 2003 by Eric L. Johnson, who is still the society’s director.  The group is committed to the idea that work in psychology—whether scholarly or clinical—should be practiced from a Christian perspective.  This is not mere integration of faith and psychology, but rather an approach that aims for a more complete and thorough intertwining of Christian worldview with psychological theory and practice.  Some good resources on the distinctives of this approach are Psychology and Christianity: Five Views and Eric Johnson’s Foundations for Soul Care (IVP, 2007).

In developing the model of Christian psychology, Dr. Johnson regularly invites Christian philosophers to contribute to the society’s publications and conferences, such as the one held last weekend.   This is because philosophers are uniquely equipped to address issues related to human

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Robert Roberts, Kevin Timpe, and Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung

consciousness, behavior, and ethics the understanding of which are crucial to psychological inquiry and counseling.  Another benefit is that there has been a renaissance in Christian philosophy during the last generation that is essentially what leaders of the SCP envision for the field of psychology.  So Christian philosophers are able to helpfully model this approach.

Among the Christian philosophers participating at the meeting (pictured at left) were Robert C. Roberts (Baylor University), Kevin Timpe (Northwest Nazarene University), Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung (Calvin College), and myself.  Roberts, a leading virtue ethicist and the author of numerous highly acclaimed works on the subject, including Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology, gave a paper on the virtue of temperance.  Timpe, author of Free Will: Sourcehood and its Alternatives, discussed freedom and moral character.  Konyndyk DeYoung, author of Glittering Vices, gave a presentation on the vice of sloth.  And my paper was on the virtue of open-mindedness.  All of our presentations were well-received by those in attendance and prompted vigorous discussion.

The Hidden Fallacies of “the Wrong Side of History”

Ever heard someone refer to a certain view as being on the “wrong side of history”?  It is an increasingly common expression.  And I find it particularly annoying, because it is typically used as a way of challenging, if not completely dismissing, the view in question, while the speaker or writer offers nothing in the way of an argument or evidential support for doing so.

Lately this phrase has been employed by everyone from Lucas Case at the Huffington Post to Shephard Smith at Fox News as both have appealed to the notion that those opposing same-sex marriage are “on the wrong side of history.”  Other recent examples can be found here and here.

So what exactly does this popular phrase really mean?  Two possibilities come to mind.  The expression might be intended to suggest that, as time goes on, most people, perhaps everyone, will hold the view in question.  Thus, Case and Smith are just saying that eventually a strong majority of Americans will favor same-sex marriage.  But, if this is what it means, then we might well ask, what does that have to do with the truth of the view?  How relevant is majority opinion to discovering the correct view on this issue?  The answers to those questions, of course, are “Nothing” and “Not at all.”  To suggest otherwise is fallacious reasoning, a logical error known as the ad populum (appeal to popular opinion) fallacy.  Even if everyone agrees about a particular view, it doesn’t follow that its true.  (History is replete with cases of extremely popular views that we know to be horribly mistaken.)

Another possible meaning of the expression “wrong side of history” is that the view in question will eventually be proven true, such as through some scientific or philosophical argument.  So, on this interpretation, Case and Smith are using the phrase to communicate their belief that reason will inevitably demonstrate that their view, that same-sex marriage should be legal, is correct.  But how could Case and Smith be so confident about that?  They certainly don’t offer any arguments themselves, nor even suggest whence such arguments might eventually come.  So their bold proclamations really amount to groundless dogma.  And this, too, is a logical fallacy, specifically known as the fallacy of unsubstantiated claim.

These two interpretations of the phrase “wrong side of history” seem to me to be the only really plausible ones.  Perhaps there is a more reasonable sense of the phrase that I am overlooking.  If so, those who use this expression have effectively concealed it, for they never explain what they mean.  But if I’ve correctly identified the hidden meanings of the phrase, then the implications aren’t flattering for those who use it.  For it appears that those who do so commit one of two fallacies: the ad populum fallacy or the fallacy of unsubstantiated claim.  In either case, use of this phrase appears to be, as it were, on the wrong side of logic.

Pain, Autonomy, and God

An article of mine entitled “Free Will and Soul Making” was recently published in Philosophia Christi.  My thesis is that the free will defense and soul-making theodicy are complementary, mutually dependent approaches to the problem of evil.  Below is a little dialogue featuring imaginary characters (as realistic as the names might seem) which explores the whole idea of embracing both approaches rather than opting for just one or the other.

PILGESE:  Hello there, Gelespi, how are you today?

GELESPI:  Doing fine, Pilgese.  And you?

PILGESE:  Fine as well, though I’ve been saddened by the news of a recent tragedy, and it has me thinking about theodicy.

GELESPI:  In what respect?

PILGESE:  The greater-good theodicy in particular.  I’m bothered by how some people talk of God intending painful circumstances to bring about greater goods.

GELESPI:  Hmm…  And just why does this bother you?

PILGESE:  I think there is something fundamentally mistaken in thinking that God intentionally causes any pain.

GELESPI:  And why is it wrong for God to cause pain?

PILGESE:  That’s not intuitively obvious to you?

GELESPI:  Not at all.  What makes it so obvious to you?

PILGESE:  Well, because pain is evil.

GELESPI:  Why is pain evil?  It is unpleasant, yes.  But unpleasantness does not imply evil.

PILGESE:  Pain is a lack of goodness, a departure from the way things should be.  And this is the essence of evil.

GELESPI:  But that can’t be right, since this implies that every time I lift weights or fast, then I’m doing evil.  Surely it’s not evil to lift weights or fast?

PILGESE:  That’s different, because you’re imposing that pain on yourself, as opposed to someone else causing your pain.

GELESPI:  And how is that relevant?

PILGESE:  Because self-inflicted pain is an autonomous choice.

GELESPI:  So you mean to say that it’s wrong for God to cause our pain because we’re not autonomously choosing it, even if that pain makes us better?

PILGESE:  Exactly.

GELESPI:  And why is it okay for me to autonomously choose to cause myself pain for my betterment but not for God to autonomously choose to do so?

PILGESE:  Because only you can autonomously choose for yourself.  That’s the nature of autonomy.  It’s the right of self-determination, as opposed to determination of others.

GELESPI:  But where does such a right come from?  Doesn’t this assume something like self-ownership?

PILGESE:  Of course.

GELESPI:  But, biblically speaking, we are not our own.  God made us, thought us into being, as it were, out of nothing.  Thus, God owns us in a way that we do not even own ourselves.  As the Apostle Paul himself says, “you are not your own” (1 Cor. 6:19), and the psalmist says, “the earth is the Lord’s and everything in it, the world and all who live in it” (Ps. 24:1).

PILGESE:  Yes, I grant that God owns us in that general sense.  But when he made us as libertarian free creatures, he endowed us with self-ownership and, thus, moral autonomy.

GELESPI:  And how do you know that?

PILGESE:  Well, that is just what it means to be free in a libertarian sense.

GELESPI:  You are confusing two issues here:  the definition of freedom and what might be called moral propriety rights.  Let’s grant the libertarian definition of freedom as the power of contrary choice, which includes a denial of universal theological determinism.  It doesn’t follow from this that God has no right to inflict pain on his creatures, so long as his intentions are always to do good, such as to build character and bring those creatures into better relationship with God.

PILGESE:  But there are many instances of suffering that do not bring about such greater goods.  This implies that God is horribly inefficient and gratuitous with the pain he inflicts.

GELESPI:  First of all, you are assuming you know what God-inflicted suffering does or does not result in greater good.  For all you know, the apparently gratuitous suffering does contribute to greater goods, if only in the next world.  Secondly, to assert that God can or does inflict some suffering does not commit one to saying that God is responsible for all of the suffering in the world.  Remember, we’re granting a libertarian view of freedom here, and this allows us to explain at least some of the worst evils, and perhaps the origin of evil, as being the result of the abuse of creaturely freedom.

PILGESE:  Hmm…  So you seem to be using two different approaches to the problem of evil: the free will defense and the greater-good theodicy.  Can you do that?

GELESPI:  Why not?

PILGESE:  Well, most theists use one or the other, not both.

GELESPI:  Why go with the crowd, Pilgese?  If both approaches are useful to address different aspects of the issue, then it seems foolish to ignore one of them.

PILGESE:  Good point, Gelespi.  I’ll have to give this some thought.

GELESPI:  Thanks.  Glad to be of service.

Recent Work on the Virtue of Open-mindedness

One of my current research projects concerns the virtue of open-mindedness, and recently two of my articles on the subject were published in scholarly journals.  One of these, which appears in the March issue of Theory and Research in Education, discusses several accounts of open-mindedness and defends William Hare’s account against some prominent alternatives, including those of Peter Gardner and Jonathan Adler.  In the essay I also compare and contrast open-mindedness with the related virtue of intellectual humility.

My other article, published in the April issue of Sophia, discusses what I call the paradox of open-mindedness and religious devotion.  To be religiously devout is presumably to be firmly committed to believing in and following God, and this includes behaving virtuously in all respects.  But such commitment seems to rule out openness to changing one’s mind about certain beliefs and values that are entailed in that religious devotion.  Now assuming (as nearly all virtue ethicists and epistemologists do) that open-mindedness is a virtue, this creates a paradox, where it appears to be virtuous to display an intellectual vice, namely closed-mindedness.  In my essay I explore a variety of potential ways of resolving this paradox.  The route that I think succeeds appeals to the possibility of personal knowledge of God via direct experience.

My work on open-mindedness is ongoing, and my long-term goal is to do a book on the subject.  More immediately, I am working on a paper entitled “Open-mindedness and Christian Flourishing” which I am slated to present at a Society for Christian Psychology conference this fall dealing with the theme “Towards a Christian Positive Psychology.”  I’ll say more about this conference in a later post.

Remembering Dr. Wynn Kenyon (1948-2012)

This past weekend I attended the funeral of my beloved professor and mentor, Wynn Kenyon, who taught Philosophy at Belhaven University in Jackson, Mississippi for three decades.  It was Kenyon who taught me how to think critically and introduced me to the notion of Christian worldview.  It was Kenyon who expanded my mind theologically, enabling me to understand the sovereignty of God in all situations.  And, most importantly, it was Kenyon who best modeled for me how to live with Christian integrity, demonstrating virtue in all domains of life, beginning with his own family.

When I came to Belhaven in the early 80s, I had no idea what subject to major in, let alone what career to pursue.  So I consulted my youth leader for advice, and he told me that someday I would meet someone and think, “I want to be just like that person.”  This, he said, would be the signal for me as to what career I should pursue.  At the time, I thought this was lame counsel but, sure enough, within a few years (and after about half a dozen of Kenyon’s Philosophy classes) it dawned on me that Wynn Kenyon was that person.  So I set my sights on graduate school and never looked back.  Since arriving at Taylor University in the early 90s, I have essentially tried to be a version of Wynn Kenyon for our community, though I know I will always fall short.

Kenyon was as unique an individual as I’ve ever known.  He was a sturdy figure, both physically and intellectually.  In terms of philosophical aptitude, he possessed a rare combination of fine analytical skills and “big picture” understanding.  One moment he would be explaining some subtle nuance on the doctrine of essences, and the next moment he would show you the implications of that point for the entire history of modern philosophy and theology.  But despite his intellectual prowess, Kenyon was remarkably humble and even boyishly playful.  He was a practical jokester and seemed to appreciate being the butt of jokes as much as playing jokes on others.  And when something amused him, he would burst forth with his signature monosyllabic laugh—Ha!  And when he found something especially funny, he would not repeat the laugh but simply increased the volume—HA!!!  Even in a crowded cafeteria, everyone would know when Kenyon was really humored by something, as his guffaw would resound, momentarily drowning out all other sounds, and bringing smiles to faces all over the room.

Kenyon was also absent-minded and notoriously unconcerned with fashion.  Known for his unkempt hair and disheveled dress, it was understood that he was too busy solving metaphysical riddles to be bothered with such mundane details.  But he was never too preoccupied to help others, even when this inconvenienced him.  For example, one day after church I inadvertently left my Bible on the roof of my car.  When I drove off, the Bible flew off the roof and split into several pieces as my girlfriend and I headed down Jackson’s busy Northside Drive.  Suddenly I remembered my Bible and quickly turned around to retrieve it.  As we headed back up the street, my girlfriend said, “Look, some kind soul is picking up your Bible in the middle of all that traffic.”  Then in one astonished voice we cried out, “Its Dr. Kenyon!”  There he was, making a spectacle of himself, not to mention risking his personal welfare, gathering all of the sections of my NIV Bible that had been strewn across the street.  I drove up, and he handed it to me with a wry grin, saying something like “Here, you might want to keep this inside your car next time.”

This anecdote typified Kenyon’s good humor and relentless servant spirit.  Wynn Kenyon’s entire life was devoted to humble service, in fact.  And I am one of thousands whose life he powerfully impacted.  Back in the 18th century, Sir Richard Steele said of Bishop George Berkeley, “Till I knew you, I thought it the privilege of angels only to be very knowing and very innocent.”  If ever there was a man of our time about whom the same could be said, it was Dr. Wynn Kenyon.  He will be missed, but the impact of his life and ministry will endure.

For more reflections on the life and adventures of Wynn Kenyon, see this Facebook Page dedicated to his memory.

Hunter and Plantinga to Visit Taylor University

In the span of one week, two noteworthy scholars will be visiting Taylor University.  James Davison Hunter will speak for the National Student Leadership Conference, hosted by Taylor this weekend.  He will arrive tomorrow and will meet with several faculty to discuss his recent book, To Change the World: The Irony, Tragedy, and Possibility of Christianity in the Late Modern World (Oxford Press).  This book has been fascinating to read, and I’m looking forward to discussing it with Hunter.  Also, I’m excited that students attending the NSLC will get a heavy dose of him.

And next week Alvin Plantinga will come to Taylor to give four different talks as part of our annual Staley Lecture Series.  Plantinga is perhaps the greatest philosopher of religion of our time and has deeply impacted several other sub-disciplines in philosophy as well.  He is the author of the highly acclaimed and influential Warrant trilogy (Oxford Press).  But if you’d like to pick up a manageable selection of his works, you should check out The Analytic Theist (Eerdmans).  Here is the schedule for Plantinga’s talks:

  • Tuesday, March 1st at 3:00 p.m. (MMVA 002) — “Warranted Christian Belief and Modern Biblical Scholarship”
  • Tuesday, March 1st at 7:00 p.m. (Recital Hall) — “Religion and Science: Where the Conflict Really Lies”
  • Wednesday, March 2nd at 10:00 a.m. (Rediger Auditorium) — “Truth and Worldviews”
  • Wednesday, March 2nd at 3:00 p.m. (Rediger Auditorium) — “Religion and Science: Divine Action in the Material World”

Unreasonable Doubt—Answering Some Critics

An article of mine, entitled “Unreasonable Doubt,” appeared in last month’s issue of Christianity Today.  It is now available on-line here.  In the article I discuss the major themes of my book, The Making of an Atheist, which aims to explain and apply the biblical account of atheism.

With the publication of the CT article, a few more folks have written me to say that I commit the ad hominem fallacy or that my book is offensive or that my argument is circular because I assume that the Bible is divinely inspired.  (Perhaps the next issue of CT will run some readers’ letters that make such protests.)  These were the main complaints among my atheist critics when the book was first published last year.  Because I’ve grown weary of rebutting these objections one by one in emails, I’ve decided it would be a good idea to address them in a blog post.  So here you go.

As regards the ad hominem fallacy accusation, my book may contain its share of mistakes, but this is surely not one of them.  The ad hominem fallacy is committed when one insists upon the rejection of a position because of some fact (or alleged fact) about the person who holds that view.  I do not argue that we should reject atheism because of any facts about atheists.  In fact, in my book I review many of the objective evidences for theism.  Rather, my thesis concerns the moral-psychological roots of atheism.  So, to use an analogy:  It would be ad hominem to say that we should reject Capitalism because Adam Smith was a bad guy.  But it would be perfectly appropriate to argue that Smith came to affirm his view because of X, Y, and Z.  The argument in my book is like the latter, not the former.

As for the supposed offensiveness of my book, well, that depends on what one means by “offensive.”  If this is intended to mean that I am insensitive, cruel, or have attacked others without justification, the charge is unfounded, even ridiculous.  I simply offer a moral-psychological account of the roots of atheism, and I do so as fairly and sensitively as I can manage.  In fact, my account parallels what Feuerbach and Freud proposed in suggesting that belief in God is a sort of psychological projection.  (I argue that atheists, as it were, “project” the absence of God, due to a combination of moral and psychological factors.)  While deeply mistaken, I would never say—nor have I ever known a fellow theist to claim—that the Feuerbach/Freud account is offensive (in the sense defined above).

Now if my critics’ claim is that my account is offensive in the sense that it is likely to be met with anger or resentment on the part of some people, then I plead guilty.  Of course it bothers atheists to be told that their worldview is irrational and that, furthermore, it is a consequence of willful rejection of God rather than an objective assessment of evidence.  So why defend the thesis at all?  Why write a book that will incite atheists?  Well, because it is an important and biblical truth that has many significant practical implications with regard to ministry, apologetics, and personal spiritual formation.  My account of atheism is really just an unpacking and filling out of what Scripture says in Romans 1:18-32, Ephesians 4:17-18, and John 3:19-21, among other passages.

So, then, in building my account of atheism on the Bible am I guilty of arguing in a circle?  No, because I am not appealing to Scripture to build an argument against the truth of atheism (or in favor of theism).  I would never cite any biblical passage as an argument for God, as this would indeed be blatantly circular.  But, assuming that God exists and that the Bible is divinely inspired, it seems appropriate to consider what, if anything, Scripture says about the causes of atheism. This is all I do in my book.  Offensive to some it may be, but it’s an important truth that needs to be heard.

A Former Atheist’s Near Death Experience

I’ve become increasingly interested in near death experiences, and the ones that interest me most are those involving atheists.  Here is one of the more well-known accounts by a former atheist, Howard Storm, who was an art professor at Northern Kentucky University when he had his experience in 1985 while awaiting surgery for an intestinal problem.  As he lost consciousness, Storm reports that he exited his body and had a distressing, hellish encounter with malevolent beings, who essentially tortured him.  In his agony and desperation, despite his atheism, he called out to Jesus to save him.  According to Storm, Jesus did just this, rescuing him from the tormenting beings and eventually introducing him to some other spiritual beings (angels?), who guided him through an intense life review and with whom Storm says he had a lengthy conversation.  The whole experience was recorded by Storm and published in his subsequent book, My Descent into Death.

After his NDE, Storm was a changed man.  Prior to the experience, he was a confirmed atheist, but afterward he could not stop talking about God and the Bible.  Storm eventually resigned from his teaching position and attended seminary to become a Christian minister.  Today he pastors a church in Ohio and does a lot of painting.  You can check out his website here.

Theism, Atheism, and the Significance of our Lives

One of the traditional complaints about atheism is that it offers no grounds for believing that life is meaningful in any significant sense.  Many old school atheists seemed to acknowledge this point.  For example, Bertrand Russell grants that the eventual desolation guaranteed by naturalism is grounds for “unyielding despair,” and atheistic existentialists like Sartre and Camus recognized that without God life appears “absurd.”  The new atheists are much more optimistic, insisting that life can be quite meaningful in the absence of God.

This makes me wonder whether life can really be as significant on an atheistic worldview as it is given the truth of theism and its correlative doctrine of an afterlife.  Suppose we conceive of the overall significance of an action as relative to its total impact on what follows after, in terms of causal influence and consequences.  Thus, for example, historians often refer to particular events, such as the assassination of Lincoln or the Treaty of Versailles as especially significant because of their impact on subsequent history.  That seems reasonable enough.  Now suppose we consider the significance of any individual human life along these lines as well, such that we recognize, say, that Martin Luther King’s life was especially significant because of all of the lives he impacted and continues to impact to this day.

Now with this understanding of life “significance” in hand, let’s compare the atheistic and theistic perspectives.  Given atheism (or to be more precise, “naturalism”), all life on Earth will eventually perish, say 10,000 years from now, and whatever impact our lives have had will cease.  I won’t say that the lives we led lose all significance as a consequence, but the significance of our lives will certainly be finite.  However, given theism and the perpetual afterlife promised on this worldview, there is literally no end to the impact of our lives, for not only may earthly deeds continue to influence others forever but our on-going choices and actions in the afterlife (Heaven and/or the New Earth, given Christian theism) will be endless as well.  Since there will be no end to our lives (at least for those who wind up in Heaven), there will be no limit to the significance of our lives or even individual actions, the effects of which may be felt and acknowledged for all eternity.

So, as we compare atheism and theism on this point, it turns out that the two worldviews could not contrast more sharply when it comes to providing grounds for the significance of human life.  Given atheism, however long earthly history proceeds, in the end it will be finite and so will the significance of our lives.  Given theism, on the other hand, the significance of our lives has no upper limit but approaches infinity.  In other words, if theism is true, then the significance of our lives is immeasurably great, while in comparison, without God the significance of our lives is infinitesimally small.  (I want to emphasize the comparative nature of my point here, for only relative to such a comparison could any degree of life significance be considered “infinitesimal.”)

So what does this mean?  Is this evidence for the truth of theism?  Not at all.  On the contrary, there are no implications here with regard to which of these two worldviews is actually true.  But what it does imply is that atheists who maintain that their lives can be just as significant (given the truth of their worldview) as those of theists (given the truth of theirs) are quite mistaken.  In fact, the difference is infinitely great.