Tag: Ethics

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The “Every Living Thing” Statement on Responsible Animal Care

By Jim Spiegel

What duties, if any, do we have toward animals? A new statement on responsible animal care addresses this question in a balanced and biblically informed way. It is being called an “evangelical statement” and appears to be the first such formal document of its kind.  You can read and, if you wish, sign the statement here. (Note that clicking on the “sign the statement” button does not commit you to signing it but merely takes you to the page where you can read the statement and have the option to sign it.)

I signed and strongly endorse the statement because I think it achieves a proper moral-theological balance when it comes to animal welfare. There are two extreme positions regarding this issue. There is the No Moral Status view, which says that animals deserve no moral consideration, and humans have no duties regarding them, except as impacts other humans. Modern philosophers such as Descartes and Kant took such a view, still popular today, which encourages us to see animals as natural resources like any other aspect of nature. On the other hand, there is the Strong Animal Rights position, which affirms that animals and humans have the same inherent value and deserve equal moral consideration. Contemporary moral philosophers such as Peter Singer and Tom Regan take such a view, which is championed by activist animal rights groups like PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals). Advocates of this approach maintain that all use of animal products for food, clothing, experimentation, or entertainment is immoral.

Somewhere between these extremes is a moderate position which affirms that animals have significant moral status, but not the same status as human beings. Accordingly, we have a duty to treat animals humanely. We ought not to treat them cruelly.  And by “cruel treatment” I mean the causing of severe and unnecessary suffering. On this view, it is morally appropriate to use animals for food, clothing, experimentation, and entertainment, but only if the animals are not treated cruelly in such contexts. The Every Living Thing statement on responsible animal care effectively achieves such a balance.

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Refusing to Serve: Moral Dimensions of the Masterpiece Cakeshop Case

By Jim Spiegel

Recently, a Colorado appeals court ruled that baker Jack Phillips—owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop in Denver—does not have a right to refuse service for a gay wedding.  The legal reasoning in this case, which affirmed previous rulings, is now the topic of much debate, and many more cases like it are sure to follow, with some perhaps being appealed all the way to the Supreme Court.

Setting the legal issues aside, what are we to say about the moral stance of the baker in this case?  Was Mr. Phillips morally justified in refusing to serve this same-sex couple?  A Christian pastor recently posed this question to me:  Assuming that same-sex marriage is inappropriate for moral-theological reasons, does a Christian baker such as Phillips have a duty to refuse to serve for a same-sex wedding?  The pastor went on to explain that he strongly affirms the traditional view of marriage as the union between one man and one woman and that, therefore, same-sex unions are immoral.  Yet, he was not convinced that Phillips would necessarily be doing anything wrong by serving the couple.  After all, the pastor said, he’s just doing his job.  Why not simply take the approach that he will serve whoever asks.  After all, Jesus says, “give to the one who asks you” (Mt. 5:42; Lk. 6:30).

In response, one might note that Jesus’ maxim here is not intended to be unqualified.  Thus, for example, presumably Jesus would not want you to strictly abide by this instruction when an inebriated friend asks you for the keys to his car so he can drive himself home.  Similarly, one might say that a business owner should not refuse anyone service unless doing so would constitute support for an immoral act.

The problem with this general qualification, the pastor pointed out, is that, as American consumers, it is virtually unavoidable to indirectly support immoral systems and policies, such as manufacturing sweat shops or environmentally hazardous practices, via our clothing and food purchases.  So how is this any different?

This is a common response to the situation, but I think it confuses the issue by comparing a clear case of problematic moral complicity with less clear “gray area” cases.  To make my point, I countered with a hypothetical case of my own:  Suppose a Christian baker is approached by members of NAMBLA (the North American Man/Boy Love Association) with a request to bake cakes for one of their meetings.  Since the baker believes, for theological reasons, that pedophilia is immoral, he refuses to serve them.  The pastor thought this would be reasonable.  And he said the same regarding another scenario I presented where a similar request is made by a Skinhead group.

So the question is this:  Is the Denver baker case more like these scenarios or is it more like cases of inadvertent support of sweatshops and other injustices through one’s purchases?

In response, I would note, first, that in many of the latter cases, we should likewise refuse to lend our support through our purchases, because it constitutes moral complicity with an immoral act.  However, it can be difficult to know when such support is significant enough to warrant our refusal to make certain purchases on those grounds.  Thus, we may want to consider two relevant moral criteria:  1) how significant is the immoral conduct in question?  And (2) how direct would be one’s support of the immoral conduct, if one acted on the request?  The reason most of us would grant that a baker is morally justified in refusing service to NAMBLA and the Skinheads is that such service would directly support these organizations, and the immoral aims of these groups are highly significant–pedophilia and ethnic hatred are serious moral crimes.

So let’s apply these questions to the Denver baker case.  Does Phillips have grounds for thinking that same-sex unions are significantly immoral?  As a Christian who takes seriously both Scripture and the unified voice of nearly two millennia of theological history, he certainly seems to.  And would the requested service directly support this conduct?  Again, the answer is yes—at least as directly as the same service would support NAMBLA and the Skinheads in the parallel cases.

So whatever legal fate might befall Mr. Phillips for refusing to serve a gay wedding, his choice is morally appropriate, given the traditional Christian sexual ethic.  However one might want to quibble with that traditional doctrine or shift focus to the political-legal dimensions of the case, Phillips’ actions are morally coherent and warranted.  Active complicity with an immoral act is wrong, and the refusal to be so complicit is morally justified.

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The Sexual Pluralist Revolution: Reasons to be Skeptical

By Jim Spiegel

In the United States the last generation has seen a decisive move away from the Judeo-Christian sexual norms that have reigned in the West for centuries.  This shift has involved a move toward sexual pluralism, the view that any sexual behavior is morally permissible so long as it takes place between mutually committed adults.  This is nothing short of revolutionary, as it constitutes a radical and abrupt change of practice and moral perspective.  This should be troubling to anyone who prizes the values of the Judeo-Christian tradition, because it flouts both natural law and biblical teaching on sexuality.  But it is also troubling for non-theological reasons.  Here I will consider several reasons why we should be especially skeptical of the rise of sexual pluralism.  I will give special attention to homosexual conduct both because this issue is so heavily emphasized by sexual pluralists and because it is now a point of controversy within some Christian communities.

One reason to be skeptical of sexual pluralism is that this movement has not been driven by rational argument, unlike other revolutionary developments such as the Protestant Reformation, the scientific revolution, and the abolitionist movement.  Rather, the sexual pluralist revolution has been powered by postmodern relativism, pop culture influences, and a confused view of tolerance that is really a disguised form of dogmatism.

Many say the sexual pluralists do have an argument, specifically the argument from nature—science has proven that our sexual orientation is innate, not under one’s control.  Yet here is another reason to be skeptical of sexual pluralism.  The so-called argument from science is spurious.  No credible studies have proven a biological basis for homosexual orientation.  Some cite the LeVay or Bailey-Pillard studies of the early 1990s, but these are seriously flawed.  Moreover, even if there were a genetic or congenital disposition toward homosexual attraction, this proves nothing regarding whether homosexual practice is ever morally appropriate.  For even if homosexual orientation is biologically determined, this does not imply that such people must choose to behave accordingly or that they are not morally culpable for their sexual choices.  To insist so is to embrace hard determinism, the view that since human choices are caused we are neither free nor morally responsible for our behavior.  The fact that sexual pluralists must appeal to such deterministic thinking shows how thin their rational grounds are.

A third reason that Christians should be skeptical of sexual pluralism is the fact that significant disagreement about the issue within the Church is historically unprecedented.  Never before the last generation was there ever serious debate among Christian theologians or ethicists regarding the moral legitimacy of homosexual behavior.  In fact, there has been considerably more debate about such fundamental doctrines as the Trinity and the divinity of Christ than there has been about this.  Other sexual issues (e.g., polygamy) have been debated, of course.  But not until the late twentieth century have Christians seriously debated the moral permissibility of homosexual practice.

This leads to a final reason to be skeptical about sexual pluralism: debate in the Church has occurred almost exclusively in North America and parts of Europe.  Christians in Africa, Asia, and South America almost uniformly affirm the traditional view.  Because of this, it is extremely misleading, even ethnocentric, to glibly declare that “Christians are very divided on the homosexuality issue” as some are wont to do.  Consult a typical Christian in Kenya or China or Brazil, and they will shake their heads in disbelief, perhaps even asking “What is wrong with American Christians that they could actually disagree about this issue?”  Good question.

For these reasons Christians are well-advised to hold fast to the historic Judeo-Christian sexual ethic.  In the coming years, doing so will be increasingly difficult, since this will demand a firm resolve to resist cultural currents.  Those on the side of biblical orthopraxy will be dismissed or, worse, persecuted.  And although sexual pluralism has no rational grounds—theologically, historically, or scientifically—it might be useless to resist with rational argument.  For a view which rises to prominence by abandoning reason can hardly be defeated through the use of reason.

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Disguised Moral Terms for Relativists

By Jim Spiegel

We live in a peculiar age.  Moral relativism is probably the dominant ethical perspective in American culture, yet at the same time there is a strong tendency among Americans (1) to dogmatically oppose certain forms of behavior and speech and (2) to be highly judgmental, even to the point of absolute condemnation, regarding those who do not fall in line with the prevailing norms of our society.  Paula Deen’s recent fall from glory is highly illustrative of this, as her racist remarks from many years ago have been judged so egregious as to be unforgivable—by the brass at the Food Network, as well as many others who have affirmed their decision to can her.  (Interestingly, there has been a very different response to Alec Baldwin’s recent abusive, anti-gay tirade.  Double standard, perhaps?  By the way, this CBS report, like many others, failed to mention the most severe and disgusting anti-gay slur in Baldwin’s tirade.  Hmm.)

When such stories hit the news, it’s always amusing to hear how people attempt to mask the moral judgments they make.  Nowadays there is a common stock of terms and phrases which serve as stand-ins for moral judgments.  By using them, one has the freedom to vent one’s moral outrage without presenting oneself as a moral judge.  And, thus, one retains plausible deniability when it comes to the charge of being a moral absolutist, while enjoying the freedom of making dogmatic moral pronouncements.  Here are some of my favorites:

  • “That’s inappropriate” – I believe it was in the early 1990s when I first became aware of the popular usage of this phrase, mainly by people in the social sciences.  It’s a favorite relativist phrase these days because what counts as “in/appropriate” can be construed at any of a number of different levels, from a whole culture to a local community to an individual person.  Very handy.
  • “That’s offensive” – This one is interesting because it teeters on the brink of an absolute moral claim while retaining the element of subjectivity (i.e., it offends me or I find it offensive).  President Obama famously resorted to this phrase during a 2012 debate with Mitt Romney, when the latter had the temerity to suggest that Obama had somehow failed regarding the Benghazi attacks.  All Obama had to do was use this phrase, accompanied by a petulant stare, and that was enough to get Romney to back off.  Again, very handy.
  • “I’ve got a problem with that” – This is a favorite of ESPN sports commentator Dan Patrick, who uses the phrase regularly on his radio show.  I recall one instance where he was touting the “live and let live” line.  One of his fellow hosts then asked him whether he’d have that same attitude if his daughter decided to work in the porn industry.  Uh, not so much.  But rather than offend anyone by calling such a choice immoral, Patrick simply said, “I’d have a problem with that.”

The ubiquity of such phrases in a largely relativist culture reflects the fact that moral judgments are irrepressible.  This is a good thing insofar as it shows that we are inherently moral beings who can’t help but make moral judgments.  But it also reveals a certain unwitting duplicity on the part of relativists, which perhaps means most Americans these days.  And there is another reason to be concerned:  such apparently morally neutral terminology might, in the end, work too well.  By veiling moral judgment and dogmatism, it can be used to oppress those who don’t share the majority opinion on certain issues.  Indeed, we are already seeing this at work when it comes to the issue of same-sex marriage, as traditionalists are increasingly being presented as “offensive” for maintaining that marriage is properly defined as a union of one man and one woman.  The recent Supreme Court decision suggests that this oppression might be coming sooner rather than later.  I’ll address this in my next post.

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The Virtue of Wisdom

By Jim Spiegel

An exciting new book has recently been released.  It is entitled Being Good: Christian Virtues for Everyday Life (Eerdmans), edited by Michael Austin and Douglas Geivett.  The book features chapters on eleven different virtues—faith, open-mindedness, wisdom, zeal, hope, contentment, courage, love, compassion, forgiveness, and humility.  I was pleased to be among the contributors, which include many superb Christian philosophers.  Each chapter aims to explain the essence of the virtue discussed with a view to benefiting readers in a practical way.  My chapter is on the virtue of wisdom, and below is an overview of what I discuss.

Generally speaking, wisdom is a kind of practical moral insight.  So it appears to be both a moral virtue and an intellectual virtue.  For the wise person has knowledge of what is the best conduct in particular situations, and this knowledge is manifested in good conduct.  So you might say that wisdom is a sort of “governing” virtue that is necessary, to some degree, for the development of all other virtues. This is why wisdom is especially important and perhaps why we find such a strong biblical emphasis on it.

How does one become wise?  Is it just a matter of study and cognitive reflection?  While we usually think in terms of beliefs determining behavior, Scripture suggests that the causal dynamic runs the other direction as well.  The Old Testament wisdom literature tells us that God makes wise the simple and grants understanding to those who humble themselves (see Psalm 19:7, Psalm 25:9, Prov. 1:4, and Prov. 11:2).  And some New Testament passages underscore the critical role of behavior when it comes to belief formation (e.g., Rom. 1:18-32, Eph. 4:18-19).

Alvin Plantinga has provided some insights regarding how vice undermines wisdom.  He notes that cognitive faculties are like any other aspect of human beings, in so far as they were designed for a purpose (to form true beliefs) and that they function properly only under certain conditions.  Like any physical organ, such as lungs or eyes, cognitive processes can malfunction because of corrupting influences.  And moral vice, such pride, resentment, or the habitual indulgence in perverse behavior, is a major cause of cognitive malfunction.  In other words, sin compromises a person’s capacity to form true beliefs, particularly regarding moral and spiritual matters.

Psychological studies have shown that, when faced with a conflict between their personal beliefs and behavior, people will often reconcile this conflict by changing the way they think about their behavior.  Rather than alter their conduct, they will take the less demanding route and search for some way to rationalize it.  This response is almost always unconscious, which of course makes for a morally insidious dynamic in contexts involving vicious behavior.  These moral-psychological insights appear to confirm the Apostle Paul’s remarks in Romans 1:18-32 where he describes how wicked behavior leads to futile thinking.

So immorality undermines the quest for wisdom.  But on the positive side, virtuous living leads to wisdom.  By living rightly we diminish the corrupting impact of sin on the mind.  Consequently, our cognitive processes can function properly, and we are more likely to form true beliefs about moral and spiritual issues.  So those who faithfully obey God will grow wiser, just as Scripture tells us.

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My Presentation at Last Week’s EPS Meeting

By Jim Spiegel

Last week I attended the national meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society in San Francisco.  I attended many interesting sessions and my own session for the Evangelical Philosophical Society (entitled “Belief, Behavior, and the Necessary Conditions for Salvation”) went well, prompting much helpful feedback from the audience.

In my paper I note that the willingness on the part of some people to label themselves or others as “Christian” despite their chronic and extreme flouting of biblical moral standards is symptomatic of the view that the sole criterion for being a Christian is cognitive in nature—specifically, an intellectual affirmation of key doctrines.  I note that this view ignores the fact that certain behavioral standards are essential to being a Christian.  Consider these words of Jesus:  “Whoever has my commands and obeys them, he is the one who loves me.  He who loves me will be loved by my Father, and I too will love him and show myself to him…  If anyone loves me, he will obey my teaching….  He who does not love me will not obey my teaching” (John 14:21-24).  Here Jesus defines love of himself not in terms of orthodox belief nor even, as our culture would prefer, passionate feelings, but in terms of obedience.

Some biblical passages even appear to make a strong connection between chronic disobedience and one’s eternal destiny, such as these assertions by the Apostle Paul:

Do you not know that the wicked will not inherit the kingdom of God?  Do not be deceived:  Neither the sexually immoral nor idolaters nor adulterers nor male prostitutes nor homosexual offenders nor thieves nor the greedy nor drunkards nor slanderers nor swindlers will inherit the kingdom of God (1 Cor. 6:9-10).

The acts of the sinful nature are obvious: sexual immorality, impurity and debauchery; idolatry and witchcraft; hatred, discord, jealousy, fits of rage, selfish ambition, dissensions, factions and envy; drunkenness, orgies and the like.  I warn you, as I did before, that those who live like this will not inherit the kingdom of God (Gal. 5:19-21).

Given the eternal ramifications of chronic, extreme wayward behavior, it would seem that false views about essential biblical moral teachings are likewise significant.  Therefore, I introduce the concept of “moral heresy” as a potentially useful conceptual tool in approaching this issue.  The ancient creeds tend to focus on historical issues (e.g., the virgin birth and the resurrection of Christ) and metaphysical issues (e.g. the Trinity and the divine incarnation of Christ).  The moral issues mentioned by Paul above are not addressed in any of the major church creeds or confessions, because they have never the source of significant debate in church history—that is, until the last few decades with regard to homosexual practice.

Next I note that since all expression of moral beliefs is a tacit endorsement of certain behaviors, publicizing one’s morally heretical views, whether or not one engages in the immoral practice oneself, might crucially undermine the faith commitment of others.  This fact appears to blur the line between beliefs and conduct in such a way as to significantly raise the stakes regarding contemporary ethical debates in the church, particularly regarding homosexuality.

Due to the current moral crisis in the American church, there is a high premium on moral discernment as well as personal virtue and integrity.  As the Apostle Paul warned the early church, “Watch your life and doctrine closely.  Persevere in them, because if you do, you will save both yourself and your hearers” (1 Tim. 4:16).

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Is God a Moral Monster?—A Book Review

By Jim Spiegel

Anyone familiar with the writings of the new atheists is aware of their penchant for taking potshots at Old Testament ethics.  Their moral objections target such things as:  (1) God’s desire to be worshipped, (2) God’s preferential treatment of the Israelites, (3) the Old Testament’s apparently low view of women, (4) the Old Testament’s approval of slavery, (5) the divinely ordered massacre of Canaanite people groups, and (6) the Old Testament’s peculiar laws related to food, hygiene, and other matters.

Richard Dawkins infamously sums up these complaints and more in The God Delusion when he calls God “a petty, unjust, unforgiving control freak; a vindictive, bloodthirsty ethnic cleanser; a misogynistic, homophobic, racist, infanticidal, genocidal, filicidal, pestilential, megalomaniacal, sado-masochistic, capriciously malevolent bully.”

So where and how to begin responding to these raving claims?  One good place to begin is Paul Copan’s new book, Is God a Moral Monster?: Making Sense of the Old Testament God.  Copan systematically addresses each of the above objections and more.  He not only presents helpful rejoinders to the new atheists’ objections but also provides an astute analysis of Old Testament ethics that demonstrates a proper sensitivity to (1) the historical-geographical context of the ancient Near East, (2) numerous complex and perplexing hermeneutical issues that arise in Old Testament studies, and (3) the moral, social, and cultural presuppositions that contemporary readers invariably bring to their reading of the Old Testament.

In sum, what Copan offers is an informed, patient, and crucially nuanced treatment of the Old Testament moral code.  Of course, as Copan rightly notes, the new atheists are not interested in nuance, so his responses to their objections are unlikely to change their minds or, for that matter, soften their inflammatory rhetoric.  For those who are willing to approach the text sympathetically, Copan’s treatment of these thorny issues is richly rewarding.

Here is a brief summary of some issues Copan addresses and how he responds to each:

  • Arbitrary Dietary Laws:  The Israelites were only permitted to eat split-hooved and cud-chewing animals.  And they could only eat fish with fins and scales.  Isn’t this irrationally arbitrary and just plain kooky?  Copan proposes that the point of these requirements was their symbolism.  Organisms that meet these criteria do not cross spheres or living boundaries.  That is, they live entirely on land or in the water.  Thus, the dietary criteria symbolized purity for the Israelites.  And “unclean animals symbolized what Israel was to avoid—mixing in with the unclean beliefs and practices of the surrounding nations.  Israel was to be like the clean animals—distinct, in their own category, and not having mixed features” (81).
  • Polygamy:  The Old Testament was apparently misogynistic.  After all, doesn’t it endorse polygamy?  Copan notes, however, that the fact that many O.T. patriarchs had multiple wives does not imply that this was a morally acceptable practice.  “Is” does not imply “ought.”  (This is just one instance of many where this principle applies to Old Testament ethical issues.)  Also, Copan shows how passages that have been interpreted as showing divine approval of polygamy (Exod. 21:7-11; Deut. 21:15-17; 2 Sam. 12:8) actually do no such thing.
  • Slavery:  Ancient Israel’s moral code permitted slavery.  This is morally repugnant and a sure sign that the God of the Old Testament was indeed a “moral monster,” right?  Not so fast.  First, Copan notes that the Old Testament “servant” (ebed) should not be equated with “slave” as we understand the term (vis-à-vis Amercian slavery).  In ancient Israel, such servanthood “was a voluntary (poverty-induced) arrangement not forced” (126).  Secondly, the Old Testament standard for servanthood constituted an enormous moral advance on other ancient Near East practices where slaves were considered property and were stripped of their familial and social identities.  O.T. servants were considered persons, not property.  And, thirdly, the Old Testament servant laws were actually devised to protect the poor.   “Israelite servitude was induced by poverty, was entered into voluntarily, and was far from optimal.  The intent of these laws was to combat potential abuses, not to institutionalize servitude” (127).
  • Killing the Canaanites:  In several O.T. passages, God commands the Israelites to completely destroy several Canaanite people groups, including the Hittites, Amorites, Perizzites, Hivites, and Jebusites.  This appears to be blatant genocide.  Copan makes many interesting points in response to this accusation, most importantly that this was not genocide or “ethnic cleansing” because God’s command was not was not based on ethnicity but sin (162).  In fact, Canaanites who repented were spared and welcomed into the Israelite community.  Secondly, we tend to overlook just how severe the Canaanite debauchery was, as they were steeped in extreme idolatry and sexual perversion.  Thirdly, as Copan puts it, “the conquest of Canaan was far less widespread and harsh than many people assume” (170).  The O.T. phrase translated “utterly destroy” does not imply that literally everyone is killed, but need only suggest a good trouncing of the enemy.   And, fourthly, the main concern was to eliminate the Canaanite sins and the deadly religious practices that inspired them rather than the Canaanite people themselves.

Copan offers a variety of observations intended to either diminish or eliminate our moral qualms with God’s commands and moral regulations in the Old Testament.  Depending on the reader, these will be more or less convincing.  But however helpful or persuasive his points are, we need to keep in mind the biblical observation that God’s ways are not our ways (Isa. 55:8).  In particular, as Copan wisely notes, “We live in a time when we’re very alert to racial discrimination and intolerance, but we aren’t as sensitized to sexual sin as past generations were.  We live in a time that sees death as the ultimate evil.  Perhaps we need to be more open to the fact that some of our moral intuitions aren’t as finely tuned as they ought to be.  The same may apply to our thoughts about what God should or shouldn’t have done in Canaan” (192).

One of Copan’s emphases in the book is that we should not resist the new atheists’ accusation that the Old Testament ethical standards were imperfect:  “Instead of glossing over some of the inferior moral attitudes and practices we encounter in the Old Testament, we should freely acknowledge them.  We can point out that they fall short of the ideals of Genesis 1-2 and affirm with our critics that we don’t have to advocate such practices for all societies” (62).  This cannot be stressed enough.

What we find in many of the Old Testament laws and regulations are either temporary concessions to human sin (e.g., regulations regarding divorce, slavery, and polygamy) or God’s punitive response to human sin (i.e., God’s commands to destroy certain Canaanite people groups).  The new atheists consistently ignore or refuse to adequately appreciate this context of God’s response to human fallenness.  Scripture’s moral “ideal” when it comes to all human relations, as Copan notes, is found in Genesis 1:26-27, which affirms humans as divine image-bearers who should work together in harmony.  It is also evident later in the New Testament, such as in some of the teachings of Jesus.  To represent the Old Testament moral code in isolation of this is a gross distortion of Scripture and a complete Christian ethic.

My criticisms of the book are minor.  First, Copan occasionally refers to God as “other-centered” (e.g., pp. 27 and 201), presumably to combat some new atheists’ claims that God is ego-centric or, in Dawkins’ terms, “megalomaniacal.”  While God is surely extremely other-concerned, even self-sacrificially, he is not other-centered.  This would be inappropriate, since God deserves everyone’s primary respect and concern, including his own.  (For a brilliant and inspiring exposition of this point, see Jonathan Edwards’ essay “The End for Which God Created the World.”)

My second quibble is less significant and essentially a matter of emphasis.  There were a few places in the book where I thought Copan would have done well to concede the difficulty of some of the problematic O.T. passages.  He does make this general point at times, as when he says, “For anyone who takes the Bible seriously, [the] Yahweh-war texts will certainly prove troubling” (188).  But I was disappointed that Copan did not concede his (or anyone’s) inability to completely resolve the moral problems presented by a few other passages.

Again, these are really minor complaints, especially when you consider the breadth and depth of the discussion in Is God a Moral Monster?  Because the book deals with so many controversial and sensitive subjects, I suppose that readers should expect to take issue with some of Copan’s analyses.  (I was surprised that I agreed with nearly all of them.)  But whether or not readers agree with Copan’s approach to each particular problem passage, his book is sure to educate and edify.  Is God a Moral Monster? is an immensely valuable resource for anyone interested in Old Testament ethics or for those who seek informed responses to the new atheists’ objections concerning the topic.  Copan is to be commended for this superb work.

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Introducing Worldview 101: A Christian Worldview Training Camp for Teens

By Jim Spiegel

Worldview 101As a professor at a Christian college, I spend a lot of time training young people to think Christianly—building students’ knowledge of Christian doctrine and sharpening their critical thinking skills.  Many of my students received solid worldview training prior to college, but a disturbingly high number of others did not.  This makes me wonder:   How much better off would they be now in terms of their Christian faith and obedience if they had been better grounded in a Christian worldview?  And where would their faith be now if they had not attended a Christian college like the one where I teach?  I suppose the alarming statistics about the percentages of students who lose their faith in college might suggest an answer to the latter question.

In any case, whether a young person attends a Christian college or State U., I believe it is crucial that they are provided a solid foundation in Christian worldview prior to stepping foot on campus.  With this in mind, I am partnering with some colleagues in a new ministry devoted to just this task.  It is called Worldview 101 and is essentially a Christian worldview training camp for teens.  It will take the form of weekday and weekend camps that involve intensive training in biblical doctrine, Christian ethics, and apologetics.  All of the camps will be led by Christian philosophers who are highly skilled in teaching on the various aspects of Christian worldview.  One of the exciting distinctives of WV101 is that we come to you.  The instructors and camp coordinator go to your church, school, or off-site location and teach your youth in a place that is most convenient to you, thus eliminating the complicated logistics of arranging for travel, lodging, etc.

For more information about Worldview 101, look here.  We are now ready to start booking camps, which will begin this May.

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Culturally Liberal and Morally Conservative

By Jim Spiegel

The recent discussion of gay marriage (see my October 2 post and related comments) has reminded me once again how difficult it is to be both culturally liberal and morally conservative.  It seems that today most folks fall into one of these categories but not the other.  That is, people tend to be either culturally liberal or morally conservative.  By culturally liberal I mean someone who readily recognizes and aggressively pursues truth, goodness, and beauty in culture-from politics and higher learning to art forms such as film, literature, and popular music.  By contrast, a cultural conservative would be someone who does not share this inclination but rather is suspicious of culture and human creative expressions.  A parallel distinction can be made regarding a person’s moral sensibilities.  Moral liberals are those who readily embrace shifts in ethical standards, while moral conservatives are suspicious of such change.

Perhaps it is only natural that people tend to be liberal or conservative generally rather than according to context or subject matter.  That is, our tendency to be liberal or conservative is not isolated to particular areas or issues.  It’s no coincidence that the artistic centers of our culture, from Hollywood and Broadway to art institutes and MTV, are also the most morally liberal communities.  And it’s also not coincidental that the most morally conservative communities tend to have little interest in the arts.  Similarly, the press and media, as well as the most prestigious centers of learning tend to be liberal, while people from the most morally conservative faith traditions are those who are least likely to run in these cultural circles.

Now these are very general observations, I know.  But these tendencies should be obvious enough to all of us.  I consider it to be a tragic trend, as it is the timeless moral truths which made American culture possible in the first place and which will sustain it as long as it lasts.  While it is appropriate to question or reject artistic norms and institutional conventions, moral verities such as the sanctity of human life and sexuality cannot be rejected without devastating repercussions, both in individual lives and culture at large.

So the noble challenge, as I see it, is to vigorously explore the arts and other aspects of contemporary culture while maintaining one’s ethical moorings; to remain committed to abiding ethical principles without sacrificing the will to eagerly pursue truth, goodness, and beauty in human creations-in short, to be a cultural liberal and a moral conservative.  It’s a challenge because somehow, at least at this time in our history, it is unnatural.  And it’s a noble challenge because it is for our own good-both as individuals and as a society.

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Media Hypocrisy in Ethics Investigations

By Jim Spiegel

The presidential race is approaching the home-stretch now, and the media frenzy to cover every detail of the candidates’ each and every move is becoming circus-like.  But, with as much as there is on the line, I suppose this is to be expected.  I suppose, too, that we should appreciate this fact about American politics.  Today the media is so thorough in its investigation of public figures that it is impossible to rise to national public office without having your private life exposed.  So if you aspire to work on Capitol Hill and have moral skeletons in your closet, then be prepared to see those bones hauled out into the light of day for all America to view.

It wasn’t always like this.  The extent of FDR’s health problems were held under wraps by the press, as were Kennedy’s adulterous liaisons.  But media-enabled cover-ups ended with Watergate.  Although it did not concern a personal indiscretion—it was a conspiratorial Republican plot to sabotage the Democrat political machine—this scandal created (or compounded) public suspicion toward our leaders.  Criminal corruption, we learned, really can go to the top.  Consequently, the media has been vigilant to scour every national politician and candidate for office to keep the American public informed as to their real character.  So I say good job, American media.

But there is something that bothers me, and with every new public scandal my annoyance grows.  While the media are tireless in their investigation of public figures, including the private lives of athletes and celebrities, they have immunized themselves to investigation.  In short, the media protect their own-mainly by not reporting ethical indiscretions of other journalists and reporters.  When was the last time you saw a report about a scandal involving a journalist or television news anchor?  Probably the only ones that come to your mind are those involving the Jayson Blair and Dan Rather or some other media person’s sins against their profession. That’s because this is the lone exception-the media will only “out” those whose immoral behavior undermines the media itself.  Otherwise, it appears, they are given a pass.

So as ethics scandals constantly rock the worlds of politics, business, sports, and entertainment, almost never do we hear of scandals among media personnel.  Not that we need more evidence of media bias, but this is especially exasperating because it doesn’t involve mere spinning of stories but constitutes turning a blind eye to bad behavior.  And the problem is not isolated but systemic.  Shame on you, American media.

What we need is a meta-media agency, a troupe of reporters whose special task is to investigate journalists and reporters to the same degree of rigor that other high-profile professionals are investigated.  How I’d love to see the media get a taste of their own medicine.  And how I’d love to see this effect a greater sense of fairness and discretion when it comes to media reports about personal issues that really have no place in public discussions.

Or maybe all we need is just a few courageous reporters who have the moral will to break this code of silence-to start holding their own profession to the same ethical standards to which they hold everyone else.  Now that would be historic.  Then I really could be proud of you, American media.