Tag: evangelical philosophical society

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Thoughts on Divine Wrath

By Jim Spiegel

Lately, I’ve been thinking a lot about the concept of divine wrath.  As often as it is displayed in the pages of Scripture, it is interesting to note how little it is discussed by Christian scholars these days.  Why is this?  And, more fundamentally, what is divine wrath after all?  Does God still exercise his wrath today?  If so, is it possible to identify instances of this?  And if it is, then what sorts of criteria might one use in order to conclude that a particular event is a case of divine wrath?  This November at the annual meeting of the Evangelical Philosophical Society I will present a paper on this subject where I address such questions.  I thought it would be an interesting exercise to process my thoughts in the form of blog posts as I prepare for this.  So this is the first of what will likely be several installments of my ruminations on the topic.  Naturally, I welcome any comments, criticisms, or suggestions you might have to offer.

For starters, it is important to note that there are many instances of divine wrath described in Scripture, and these include both Old Testament and New Testament narratives.  Here are some examples:

  • The worldwide flood (Gen. 6-9)
  • The destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen. 19)
  • The Egyptian plagues (Exod. 7-12)
  • The death of Ananias and Sapphira (Acts 5:1-11)
  • The death and illness of those who abused communion (1 Cor. 11:29-31)

There are many other biblical events that may be regarded as instances of divine wrath, but these all seem to be paradigmatic cases, as they all involve the termination of human lives.  I select these cases for just this reason, as one might object that narratives where God causes suffering or discomfort without killing anyone (e.g., Paul’s “thorn in the flesh” described in 2 Cor. 12:7-10) are too mild to properly be described as wrathful.

Still, despite the consistent theme of death, there is a certain variety in the narrative accounts listed above.  Some involve the killing of thousands of people, while others involve a more surgical strike on one or two people.  Some are preceded by warnings, while others seem sudden and unanticipated.  Yet what they all have in common is divine chastisement for human sin.  Such chastisement appears to serve a number of functions, including retribution, rebuke, discipline, and purification.  And it is here where things get especially interesting, as far as I’m concerned, regarding divine wrath and our usual way of viewing it.  For at least three of these functions may be construed as potentially redemptive.  That is, God’s wrath may be seen as serving a positive or constructive aim, namely to correct, improve, enlighten, or purify people.

Some biblical reinforcement of this idea of a redemptive function of divine wrath can be found in this passage from the book of Jeremiah:

The word of the Lord came to me.  He said, “Can I not do with you, Israel, as this potter does?” declares the Lord.  “Like clay in the hand of the potter, so are you in my hand, Israel.  If at any time I announce that a nation or kingdom is to be uprooted, torn down and destroyed, and if that nation I warned repents of its evil, then I will relent and not inflict on it the disaster I had planned.  And if at another time I announce that a nation or kingdom is to be built up and planted, and if it does evil in my sight and does not obey me, then I will reconsider the good I had intended to do for it.  Now therefore say to the people of Judah and those living in Jerusalem, ‘This is what the Lord says: Look! I am preparing a disaster for you and devising a plan against you.  So turn from your evil ways, each one of you, and reform your ways and your actions.’” (Jeremiah 18:5-11)

Here God’s aim in threatening “disaster” is to prompt Israel’s repentance from the evil in which they currently indulge.  In cases where God actually exercises his wrath rather than merely threatening it, the effect can be even greater.  Jude tells us that God’s destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah served “as a warning of the eternal fire of God’s judgment” (Jude 1:7).  Regarding God’s inflicting sickness and death on those who abused communion, Paul says, “when we are judged in this way by the Lord, we are being disciplined so that we will not be finally condemned with the world.”  And in the case of Ananias and Sapphira, Luke tells us that “great fear seized the whole church” when they heard of the sudden death of these two dishonest people (Acts 5:11), which we may assume resulted in an increase of moral seriousness among the early Christians.

So as severe and disturbing as these events must have been to the communities who witnessed them, they do seem to have served the end of prompting repentance and motivating more virtuous living among the people of God.  And, of course, this is very redemptive.  So if, as I suspect, the reticence of the contemporary church regarding the doctrine of divine wrath is due to the perception that the subject is entirely negative, this is serious mistake.  While certainly divine retribution is an uncomfortable idea—as any instance of severe punishment is—we should be encouraged by the notion that God (1) does not tolerate human wickedness indefinitely and (2) he is committed enough to our moral improvement to go to extremes to warn, chide, rebuke, and prod us to greater obedience and virtue.  And this certainly seems consistent with genuine love.

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My Presentation at Last Week’s EPS Meeting

By Jim Spiegel

Last week I attended the national meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society in San Francisco.  I attended many interesting sessions and my own session for the Evangelical Philosophical Society (entitled “Belief, Behavior, and the Necessary Conditions for Salvation”) went well, prompting much helpful feedback from the audience.

In my paper I note that the willingness on the part of some people to label themselves or others as “Christian” despite their chronic and extreme flouting of biblical moral standards is symptomatic of the view that the sole criterion for being a Christian is cognitive in nature—specifically, an intellectual affirmation of key doctrines.  I note that this view ignores the fact that certain behavioral standards are essential to being a Christian.  Consider these words of Jesus:  “Whoever has my commands and obeys them, he is the one who loves me.  He who loves me will be loved by my Father, and I too will love him and show myself to him…  If anyone loves me, he will obey my teaching….  He who does not love me will not obey my teaching” (John 14:21-24).  Here Jesus defines love of himself not in terms of orthodox belief nor even, as our culture would prefer, passionate feelings, but in terms of obedience.

Some biblical passages even appear to make a strong connection between chronic disobedience and one’s eternal destiny, such as these assertions by the Apostle Paul:

Do you not know that the wicked will not inherit the kingdom of God?  Do not be deceived:  Neither the sexually immoral nor idolaters nor adulterers nor male prostitutes nor homosexual offenders nor thieves nor the greedy nor drunkards nor slanderers nor swindlers will inherit the kingdom of God (1 Cor. 6:9-10).

The acts of the sinful nature are obvious: sexual immorality, impurity and debauchery; idolatry and witchcraft; hatred, discord, jealousy, fits of rage, selfish ambition, dissensions, factions and envy; drunkenness, orgies and the like.  I warn you, as I did before, that those who live like this will not inherit the kingdom of God (Gal. 5:19-21).

Given the eternal ramifications of chronic, extreme wayward behavior, it would seem that false views about essential biblical moral teachings are likewise significant.  Therefore, I introduce the concept of “moral heresy” as a potentially useful conceptual tool in approaching this issue.  The ancient creeds tend to focus on historical issues (e.g., the virgin birth and the resurrection of Christ) and metaphysical issues (e.g. the Trinity and the divine incarnation of Christ).  The moral issues mentioned by Paul above are not addressed in any of the major church creeds or confessions, because they have never the source of significant debate in church history—that is, until the last few decades with regard to homosexual practice.

Next I note that since all expression of moral beliefs is a tacit endorsement of certain behaviors, publicizing one’s morally heretical views, whether or not one engages in the immoral practice oneself, might crucially undermine the faith commitment of others.  This fact appears to blur the line between beliefs and conduct in such a way as to significantly raise the stakes regarding contemporary ethical debates in the church, particularly regarding homosexuality.

Due to the current moral crisis in the American church, there is a high premium on moral discernment as well as personal virtue and integrity.  As the Apostle Paul warned the early church, “Watch your life and doctrine closely.  Persevere in them, because if you do, you will save both yourself and your hearers” (1 Tim. 4:16).

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EPS Apologetics Conference

By Jim Spiegel

The ninth annual EPS Apologetics Conference will be held November 18-20 at Johnson Ferry Baptist Church in Marietta, Georgia.   You can find out more about the conference here.

The keynote speakers include Alvin Plantinga, William Lane Craig, and Gary Habermas.  Plantinga’s talk will address religion and science and will feature two interesting claims—that there is no conflict between evolutionary theory and classical Christian belief, while there is a conflict between evolutionary theory and naturalism.  He will go on to argue that since naturalism is a kind of religion, or quasi-religion, it turns out that there is a science-religion conflict.  Its just not a conflict between science and Christianity, as usually thought.  Wow.  Once again, Plantinga is as ironic as he is insightful.

Habermas’s talk will focus on the famous Shroud of Turin, which is once again making news headlines.  Habermas will consider the likelihood that the shroud is the actual burial cloth of Jesus and how, if at all, this might serve as further evidence for the resurrection.

In addition to these plenary talks, there will be many concurrent sessions, including my presentation on the morning of Saturday, November 20.  I will discuss the thesis of my book, The Making of an Atheist.

If you are interested in attending, you’ll be glad to know that the cost of the conference is very affordable—as little as $15 ($10 for EPS members) if you register by September 30.  I hope to see you there!

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Two Approaches to the Problem of Evil

By Jim Spiegel

One of the most challenging issues in the philosophy of religion is the problem of evil.  Put simply, the problem concerns the difficulty of reconciling the reality of evil—from immoral behaviors to diseases and natural disasters—with the existence of an all-powerful and perfectly good God.  If God is almighty, then he can prevent evil, and if God is morally perfect, then presumably he would wantto prevent it.  Yet evil exists—in massive doses, in fact.  On its face, then, the problem amounts to evidence against theism, at least as traditionally construed.  One way out would be to deny God is omnipotent, as Harold Kushner essentially does in his book When Bad Things Happen to Good People.  Another route would be to surrender belief in God’s goodness.  But these approaches contradict the biblical portrait of God.  So, it seems, the theist is in a fix.

Since the ancient philosopher Epicurus first posed the evidential problem of evil, theists have proposed many ways of eluding its logic by contriving “theodicies”—explanations as to why God would permit sin and suffering in this world.  Two of the most well-worn among these are the “free will theodicy” and the “soul-making theodicy.”  Both of these aim to deny the premise that God would not want to allow evil.  Each explains God’s permission of evil in terms of some greater goods that God wanted to achieve in this world. 

According to the free will theodicy the greater goods God desired were the various goods that depend upon human freedom, such as genuine relationships and moral qualities.  But, of course, we have misused our freedom and, well, now things are a mess.  But the risk, so to speak, was worth it, or so say defenders of the free will theodicy.  According to the soul-making theodicy, the greater goods God aims to achieve by permitting evil is higher or “second-order” virtues which can only be displayed in response to evil.  For example, forgiveness requires sin to forgive, perseverance demands difficulty to overcome, and so on.  Such traits as forgiveness, perseverance, patience, compassion, mercy, etc. are good and beautiful virtues, and well worth the price of evil to achieve.  Or so say proponents of the soul-making theodicy.

I think both of these theodicies are helpful in dealing with the problem of evil.  But is either one preferable to or more helpful than the other?  This question has been occupying my mind a bit lately, as I will be giving a presentation on it at next week’s national meeting of the Evangelical Philosophical Society in Providence, Rhode Island, which will be held at the Rhode Island Convention Center.  (Once it is finished, I plan to post my paper on this blog.)  If you’ll be in the New England area from November 18-21, you might want to consider checking out this conference and hearing presentations by some leading lights in the world of Christian philosophy and theology.  It’s not too late to register.  And I also invite you to consider joining the EPS or its sister organization, the Evangelical Theological Society.  In each case, membership is inexpensive and includes a subscription to the society’s journal (Philosophia Christi or the Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society).