Tag: freedom

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Pain, Autonomy, and God

By Jim Spiegel

An article of mine entitled “Free Will and Soul Making” was recently published in Philosophia Christi.  My thesis is that the free will defense and soul-making theodicy are complementary, mutually dependent approaches to the problem of evil.  Below is a little dialogue featuring imaginary characters (as realistic as the names might seem) which explores the whole idea of embracing both approaches rather than opting for just one or the other.

PILGESE:  Hello there, Gelespi, how are you today?

GELESPI:  Doing fine, Pilgese.  And you?

PILGESE:  Fine as well, though I’ve been saddened by the news of a recent tragedy, and it has me thinking about theodicy.

GELESPI:  In what respect?

PILGESE:  The greater-good theodicy in particular.  I’m bothered by how some people talk of God intending painful circumstances to bring about greater goods.

GELESPI:  Hmm…  And just why does this bother you?

PILGESE:  I think there is something fundamentally mistaken in thinking that God intentionally causes any pain.

GELESPI:  And why is it wrong for God to cause pain?

PILGESE:  That’s not intuitively obvious to you?

GELESPI:  Not at all.  What makes it so obvious to you?

PILGESE:  Well, because pain is evil.

GELESPI:  Why is pain evil?  It is unpleasant, yes.  But unpleasantness does not imply evil.

PILGESE:  Pain is a lack of goodness, a departure from the way things should be.  And this is the essence of evil.

GELESPI:  But that can’t be right, since this implies that every time I lift weights or fast, then I’m doing evil.  Surely it’s not evil to lift weights or fast?

PILGESE:  That’s different, because you’re imposing that pain on yourself, as opposed to someone else causing your pain.

GELESPI:  And how is that relevant?

PILGESE:  Because self-inflicted pain is an autonomous choice.

GELESPI:  So you mean to say that it’s wrong for God to cause our pain because we’re not autonomously choosing it, even if that pain makes us better?

PILGESE:  Exactly.

GELESPI:  And why is it okay for me to autonomously choose to cause myself pain for my betterment but not for God to autonomously choose to do so?

PILGESE:  Because only you can autonomously choose for yourself.  That’s the nature of autonomy.  It’s the right of self-determination, as opposed to determination of others.

GELESPI:  But where does such a right come from?  Doesn’t this assume something like self-ownership?

PILGESE:  Of course.

GELESPI:  But, biblically speaking, we are not our own.  God made us, thought us into being, as it were, out of nothing.  Thus, God owns us in a way that we do not even own ourselves.  As the Apostle Paul himself says, “you are not your own” (1 Cor. 6:19), and the psalmist says, “the earth is the Lord’s and everything in it, the world and all who live in it” (Ps. 24:1).

PILGESE:  Yes, I grant that God owns us in that general sense.  But when he made us as libertarian free creatures, he endowed us with self-ownership and, thus, moral autonomy.

GELESPI:  And how do you know that?

PILGESE:  Well, that is just what it means to be free in a libertarian sense.

GELESPI:  You are confusing two issues here:  the definition of freedom and what might be called moral propriety rights.  Let’s grant the libertarian definition of freedom as the power of contrary choice, which includes a denial of universal theological determinism.  It doesn’t follow from this that God has no right to inflict pain on his creatures, so long as his intentions are always to do good, such as to build character and bring those creatures into better relationship with God.

PILGESE:  But there are many instances of suffering that do not bring about such greater goods.  This implies that God is horribly inefficient and gratuitous with the pain he inflicts.

GELESPI:  First of all, you are assuming you know what God-inflicted suffering does or does not result in greater good.  For all you know, the apparently gratuitous suffering does contribute to greater goods, if only in the next world.  Secondly, to assert that God can or does inflict some suffering does not commit one to saying that God is responsible for all of the suffering in the world.  Remember, we’re granting a libertarian view of freedom here, and this allows us to explain at least some of the worst evils, and perhaps the origin of evil, as being the result of the abuse of creaturely freedom.

PILGESE:  Hmm…  So you seem to be using two different approaches to the problem of evil: the free will defense and the greater-good theodicy.  Can you do that?

GELESPI:  Why not?

PILGESE:  Well, most theists use one or the other, not both.

GELESPI:  Why go with the crowd, Pilgese?  If both approaches are useful to address different aspects of the issue, then it seems foolish to ignore one of them.

PILGESE:  Good point, Gelespi.  I’ll have to give this some thought.

GELESPI:  Thanks.  Glad to be of service.

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On a Certain Irony in the Case for Gay Rights

By Jim Spiegel

When it comes to the debate on human sexuality, typically it is traditionalists who are painted as enemies of freedom.  After all, they are the ones who insist that extra-marital sex is wrong and should be discouraged.  However, the central argument used by many gay rights advocates also opposes freedom but in a much more fundamental sense than traditionalism. 

Let me explain.  Consider the popular gay rights slogan “biology is destiny” and the argument which often accompanies this phrase.  The idea is that some people are “born” homosexuals, due either to certain genetic factors or neurological hard-wiring which strongly predispose them to have a sexual attraction to members of the same sex.  For this reason, the argument goes, the traditionalist view that homosexual relations are immoral is wrongheaded, not to mention insensitive.  For how can people be blamed for what they cannot control?  As Immanuel Kant said (paraphrasing Pelagius a millennium before him), “ought implies can.”  If homosexuals cannot choose to be other than what they are, then there is no sense in telling them they ought to act otherwise.

Notice that the “biology is destiny” argument really amounts to the claim that homosexuals cannot help themselves regarding both their sexual preference and their choice as to whether to have sex at all.  The implication (or at least suggestion) in both cases is that their desires are irresistible.  That is, given their biological (and psychological) make-up, they cannot act otherwise than they do.  Now there is a general name for views such as this:  determinism.  Determinists believe that all phenomena, including human behavior and choices, are caused.  Among determinists there is disagreement as to whether we are, nonetheless, free and responsible for our behavior.  Those determinists who affirm the logical compatibility of determinism and freedom are called compatibilists (or, alternatively, soft determinists).  In contrast, those who maintain that determinism rules out human freedom and responsibility are called hard determinists.

So here’s the point.  In using the “biology is destiny” argument, gay rights advocates tacitly endorse hard determinism, at least as far as human sexuality goes.  That is, they deny that human beings are free when it comes to their sexual choices and behavior.  More than this, they deny we are morally responsible in these matters.  Ironically, then, proponents of the biological argument are enemies of human freedom and in a much more profound sense than their traditionalist opponents.  They deny freedom both morally (in the sense of responsibility) and metaphysically (in the sense of the ability to choose). 

Of course, not all gay rights advocates believe, strictly speaking, that “biology is destiny,” that there is a “gay gene” or some other entirely biological determinant of homosexual orientation.  But even the skeptical gay rights folks almost always accept some sort of determinism in the matter, whether it is psychological, social, or some combination of factors including biology.  How ironic it is that traditionalists are routinely criticized for being anti-freedom when it is gay rights advocates who implicitly deny freedom in a much more radical way.